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Abstract
We estimate an equilibrium model of decision-making in the US Supreme Court which
takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices.
We present a measure of the value of information in the court: the probability that a
justice votes differently than what she would have voted for in the absence of case-specific
information. Our results suggest a sizable value of information: in roughly 44% of cases,
justices’ initial leanings are changed by their personal assessments of the case. Our results
also confirm the increased politicization of the Supreme Court in the last quarter century.
We perform counterfactual simulations to draw implications for institutional design.
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The Value of Information in the Court.
Get it Right, Keep it Tight.∗
Matias Iaryczower and Matthew Shum†
“ A judge sworn to decide impartially can offer no forecasts, no hints, for that
would show not only disregard for the specifics of the particular case, it would
display disdain for the entire judicial process.” From the statement submitted
to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary by Justice Ruth Ginsburg.
“One should always subordinate his own personal views, whether they be
economic, social, political, or whatever they may be, because when you are
talking about your own views you are only one of millions of individuals in the
country. When you are interpreting the law, perhaps you have a special skill
and special training that does give you the right to pass on these questions.
I have to confess that in this open area, sometimes inevitably, a man is the
product of his own background and he may be somewhat influenced. But I
will do my very best to subordinate those considerations because I think that
is the duty of any judge.” Justice John Stevens, in his Senate confirmatory
hearing
1 Introduction
It is a commonplace, in the press and popular discussions, to characterize the Supreme
Court in terms of the ideological divisions among its members. In the Roberts’ 06-
09 court, for example, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito
are typically thought of as the Court’s conservative wing, while Justices Kennedy and
O’Connor are depicted as moderates, and Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer as part
of the Court’s liberal wing.
This ideological characterization of the court can be a useful starting point in an-
alyzing the behavior of Supreme Court justices. But a purely ideological account is
∗The title follows words from Justice Ruth Ginsburg, “If confirmed, I will take the counsel to heart
and strive to write opinions that both ‘get it right’ and ‘keep it tight’ ” (statement submitted to the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
†Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California
91125, USA, emails: miaryc@hss.caltech.edu, mshum@caltech.edu
incomplete at best. Judging entails deciding what was decided ; it requires understanding
the case under consideration, understanding the body of the law, and interpreting the
meaning of the law as it applies to the case. As Justice Ruth Ginsburg put it, “[E]ach
case is based on particular facts and its decision should turn on those facts and the
governing law, stated and explained in light of the particular arguments the parties or
their representatives choose to present.”1 This particular decision-making process is the
reason why the qualifications of candidates to the Supreme Court receive close scrutiny
in the press, and why the competence of candidates is a significant factor explaining
whether senators vote to confirm a nominee (Segal, Cameron, and Cover (1990, 1992),
Epstein, Lindstadt, Segal, and Westerland (2006)). Qualifications matter because the
decision-making process in the Court is not only ideological.2
In this paper, we build on the existing literature to incorporate the value of informa-
tion into the purely ideological framework of the spatial model. We provide an analysis
of decision-making in the court taking into account not only the possible bias or ideology
of justices, but also the information available to the justices in each case, as well as their
ability – or skill, as Justice Stevens puts it – to map the law and the specifics of the case
to an outcome. In this context, we ask: does the case information have enough power
to overturn the prior biases and ideological considerations of the justices? Our analysis
allows us to quantify precisely the degree to which justices “subordinated” their personal
views and “interpreted” the law.
To tackle this question, we consider a model in which ideology interacts with common
values in an incomplete information context.3 We then estimate the parameters of the
model from Supreme Court voting outcomes. In order to do this, we introduce a new
estimation approach that allows us to handle our model of voting with common values
and strategic agents.
In the model, we assume that the goal of any justice i in any given case t is that
she (in the expressive voting model) or the Court (in the strategic voting model) rules
according to i’s own best understanding of how the law applies to the particulars of
the case. We maintain that it is the residual uncertainty in the meaning of the law
which allows justices to differ in their opinions about a case. With anything less than
complete certainty, opinions can differ among justices because of idiosyncratic thresholds
of proof brought by ideological differences, because of differences in the information that
is effectively available to each justice, or because of differences in the ability to evaluate
the available information in different contexts.
In particular, we assume that before ruling in each case t, each justice observes a
private signal, which reflects her understanding of the particulars of the case. The pre-
cision (θit) of each justice’s signal measures her ability to map the specifics of the case
1From the statement submitted to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary by Justice Ruth Ginsburg.
2See also Cameron and Kornhauser (2008) and Lax and Cameron (2007).
3Such models of voting have been proposed in the information aggregation literature on voting. See
for example Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, 1998). Our model is
closest to Duggan and Martinelli (2001).
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to the meaning of the law. The imprecision in the information leaves room for inter-
pretation, which in turn allows ideological biases to come into play. These biases could
reflect variation across a liberal/conservative dimension, theoretical arguments about the
law, or other determinants for a non-neutral approach to this case. In the model, this
bias or ideology boils down to a threshold piit such that the justice prefers to rule for
the Plaintiff in this case if and only if the probability that the law favors the Plaintiff is
at least piit.
4 Information precision and bias then interact to produce outcomes. Higher
precision means that it is typically more clear for the justice whether the ruling should
favor the Plaintiff or the Defendant according to the body of law. A larger bias means
that despite her case information, a justice persists in going with her preconception of
how to rule in a case like this. In the extreme, with piit ≈ 0 (or piit ≈ 1), justice i will
vote almost completely in line with her ideology. On the other hand, when piit = 1/2 for
all i, the setting boils down to an unbiased, pure common values model.
In the estimation, we recover the values of (θit, piit)|Xt for each justice i conditioning on
observable covariates Xt of the cases and the justices. Thus justices’ bias and information
precision vary with the type of issue, characteristics of the Plaintiff and the Defendant,
and other case characteristics, as well with their own judicial experience, court experi-
ence, and other individual characteristics of each justice. We estimate the model in two
steps. In the first step, using the observed votes, we estimate a “reduced-form” model of
justices’ probabilities of voting in favor of the Plaintiff when the law favors the Plaintiff
and when the law favors the Defendant. In the second step, we recover the structural
parameters characterizing justices’ preferences and information {(θit, piit)}ni=1|Xt, using
the equilibrium conditions in the voting model. We do this for both the expressive
voting model (where justices care about getting their decision right) and the strategic
voting model, where justices are concerned about getting the court’s decision right, and
therefore “learn” from their peers in equilibrium.
Our approach allows us to disentangle the effects of ideology and information for each
justice, and therefore to quantify the tradeoffs between ideology and information in the
court. The main result of the paper is a measure of the value of information in the court.
Our measure, FLEX, is the probability that a justice i votes differently that what he or
she would have voted for in the absence of case specific information.
The results suggest a sizable value of information in the court: in roughly 44% of
cases, justices’ initial leanings – which reflect their priors or their ideological biases – are
changed by the case-specific private information of the justices. Moreover, the temporal
evolution of FLEX scores suggest that the increased politicization of the Supreme Court
appointment process pointed out by the literature has become uniformly marked only
in the last quarter-century, following the failed nomination of justice Bork (i.e., within
the Rehnquist and Roberts courts). Indeed, for Economics and Federalism cases, FLEX
scores have fallen about 40% from the Warren to the Roberts courts, but for basic rights
and criminal issues we see a marked decrease in FLEX scores (of about 20% and 16%
4We write piit and θit instead of simply pii, θi because in the estimation we allow these parameters to
change with the characteristics of each case Xt.
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respectively) only during the Rehnquist and Roberts courts.
In other results, we compare the value of information across individual justices and
issues. We show that justices with the lowest FLEX scores tend to have a liberal judicial
philosophy, while justices with the highest FLEX scores are not necessarily conservative,
and include a more than proportional share of chief justices. We also show that the value
of information in the court is lower in issue areas in which ideological considerations tend
to weigh more heavily – such as Basic Rights. We also consider whether justices are
differently predisposed when the government is involved in a case (they are), and when
the court considers the constitutionality of a law enacted by Congress (they are, in Basic
Rights cases).
Finally, we use counterfactual simulations to draw implications for institutional de-
sign. In particular, we compare the performance of the court with a counterfactual
scenario in which ruling against the Defendant requires the unanimous consent of the
justices. In a small committee composed of a heterogeneous group of individuals in
terms of both preferences and abilities, such as the Court, majority rule does not gener-
ically dominate unanimity rule. The results for the Court however are in line with the
asymptotic results first pointed out by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) (see also Dug-
gan and Martinelli (2001) and Meirowitz (2002), that unanimity rule leads to a larger
probability of error than simple majority rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the relation with the
literature. Section 3 introduces the theoretical model. Section 4 describes the data, and
Section 5 describes the estimation procedure. Section 6 discusses the results. Section 7
concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper builds on the significant contributions of a large literature. A first group
of papers uses justices’ voting data - the proportion of votes in favor and against the
Defendant, or the proportion of liberal and conservative votes - to test various hypothesis
in reduced form models. Segal and Cover (1989) show that the ideology of each justice
- as measured by the proportion of liberal and conservative statements in newspaper
editorials - is highly correlated with the votes of justices in civil liberties cases. Segal,
Epstein, Cameron, and Spaeth (1995) expands the coverage of the original SC scores,
and shows that the correlation is lower for other justices and other issues (economic
regulation). Epstein and Mershon (1996) further argue that newspaper editorials are
tilted towards a few “splashy” civil liberties issues, and show that the scores have little
explanatory power for most non-civil liberty areas. Epstein, Hoekstra, Segal, and Spaeth
(1998) argue that the preferences of justices - as measured by the proportion of liberal
votes on civil liberties cases - changes through time.5 Finally, Landes and Posner (2008)
5See also Segal and Spaeth (1993) and Epstein and Knight (1997).
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argues that members of a liberal or conservative minority do not tend to vote more often
with the majority the larger the majority is. They also show that justices appointed
by Democratic presidents (but not those appointed by Republican presidents) vote more
liberally the fewer of them there are.
The first group of papers measures the ideological preferences of justices with the
proportion of liberal statements in newspaper editorials or directly with the proportion
of liberal votes by each justice. A second group of papers employs a radically different
approach to recover the ideology of the justices from the data. Martin and Quinn (2002,
2007) build on the influential literature analyzing voting records in legislatures (Poole
and Rosenthal (1985, 1991), Heckman and Snyder (1997), Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers
(2004)). The main idea here is to assume that the voting data is generated by a precise
model of behavior - the sincere spatial voting model (SVM) commonly employed in
political science - and then estimate the parameters of the model from the voting data
(i.e., structural estimation). Building on the findings of Epstein, Hoekstra, Segal, and
Spaeth (1998), Martin and Quinn also allow ideal policies to change flexibly through time,
but the underlying theoretical model is otherwise the same as in the above papers.6,7
For all its attractive properties, the sincere spatial voting model (SVM) has one severe
limitation when applied to the analysis of voting in the Court: it is a pure private values
model in which ideology is the only determinant of voting behavior. This precludes the
possibility of common values and dispersed information which, as we argued above, seem
central to the nature of decision-making in the court. In this paper, we therefore struc-
turally estimate a model that allows both ideology and precision of private information to
come into play. With common values and dispersed information, strategic considerations
– which are absent in the sincere voting spatial model – come into play.8,9
In this paper we introduce a new estimation procedure to deal with ideology and
common values in the context of equilibrium behavior. The closest effort is that of
Iaryczower, Katz, and Saiegh (2009), who model strategic voting and common values in
6More recently, Degan and Merlo (2008) and de Paula and Merlo (2009) consider the nonparametric
identification and estimation of the ideological voting model. Coate and Conlin (2004), Coate, Conlin,
and Moro (2008), and Kawai and Watanabe (2009) also perform structural estima tion of strategic voting
(ie. “pivotal voting”) models, with ideological voters.
7See Lim (2008) for structural estimation of a model that incorporates career concerns into judges’
behavior.
8See however Londregan (1999), Clinton and Meirowitz (2003) and Clinton and Meirowitz (2004),
who analyze the spatial voting model without assuming sincere voting, paying attention to agendas and
sequence.
9It should be emphasized that we are referring here to strategic considerations that are internal to
the Court. Justices may also be strategic in response to the behavior of political actors outside of the
Court (the president, Congress). Whether Justices indeed respond or not to these outside pressures is a
matter of debate in the literature, captured in the ‘attitudinal‘ vs ’rational choice’ camps (see Segal and
Spaeth (1993), Gely and Spiller (1990); ?). Clearly, however, for all the rationality in our model, this
paper is not any more in the ‘rational choice’ than in the ‘attitudinal‘ camps. Also see Cameron, Segal,
and Songer (2000) and Daughety and Reinganum (2006) for strategic models of incomplete information
explaining how appellate judges may influence the cases that the SC chooses to hear.
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Congress.10 The underlying theoretical model in that paper, however, is designed to deal
with the bicameral aspect of Congress, and is otherwise less flexible than the model we
consider here.
3 The Model
The court is composed of n justices, i = 1, . . . , n, who consider T independent cases,
t = 1, . . . , T . In each case t, justice i can rule in favor or against the Defendant. We
denote this ruling by vti ∈ {0, 1}, with vti = 0 indicating a ruling in favor of the Defendant
and vti = 1 a ruling in favor of the Plaintiff. The court aggregates the decisions of the
individual justices by simple majority rule; i.e. rules in favor of the Plaintiff (vt = p) if∑
i v
t
i ≥ Rs ≡ n+12 and in favor of the Defendant (vt = d) otherwise.
We consider two related models of individual behavior. In the expressive or sincere
voting model, we assume that in deciding their vote, justices care only about their indi-
vidual vote. In the strategic or outcome-oriented voting model, we assume instead that
justices care about the ruling of the court. We assume that the goal of any justice i in
any given case t is that she (in the expressive voting model) or the court (in the strategic
voting model) rules according to i’s own best understanding of how the law applies to
the particulars of the case.
Specifically, before ruling in each case t, each justice i observes a private signal sit =
ωt + σitεt, where εt ∼ N (0, 1). Here ωt ∈ {0, 1} in an unobservable variable – for both
the econometrician and the justices – indicating whether the meaning of the law favors
the Plaintiff (ωt = 1) or the Defendant (ωt = 0), and θit = 1/σit is a scale parameter that
parametrizes the informativeness of i’s signals. This parameterization of the information
structure satisfies the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP), which is important
in what follows.
Justices care about this information because their payoffs are state dependent. In
particular, we assume that given piit ∈ (0, 1), justice i has a payoff of −piit when the
law favors the Defendant but she/the court rules in favor of the Plaintiff (vt = 1 when
ωt = 0) and of −(1 − piit) when the law favors the Plaintiff but instead she/the court
rules in favor of the Defendant (vt = 0 when ωt = 1). The payoffs of vt = ωt = 0 and
vt = ωt = 1 are normalized to zero. Thus given information E, Justice i votes to rule
against the Defendant in t if and only if Pri(ωt = 1|E) ≥ piit. Equivalently, justice i
votes to rule against the Defendant in case t given E if and only if the likelihood ratio
Pri(E|ωt = 1)/Pri(E|ωt = 0) is larger than piit1−piit
1−ρt
ρt
, where ρt ≡ Pr(ωt = 1) denotes jus
tices’ common prior probability of the unobserved state ωt. Note that since ωt is assumed
to be unobservable, there is always information that would make any two justices disagree
about a case. Moreover, if sufficiently biased, two justices can disagree almost always.
10 In Chiang and Knight (2008), common values enter a non-strategic model in which voters gain
information about candidates from newspaper endorsements.
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In particular, with piit ≈ 0 (or piit ≈ 1), justice i is almost always ideological. On the
other hand, when piit = 1/2 for all i, the setting boils down to an unbiased, pure common
values model.11
The two alternative models of behavior differ in how much information each justice
has in equilibrium. In the expressive voting model, justices care about their own ruling,
and therefore vote based on their own information sit, i.e., rule against the Defendant
whenever Pri(ωt = P |sit) ≥ piit. Then E consists only of sit, and i votes to rule against
the Defendant if
Pr(sit|ωt = 1)
Pr(sit|ωt = 0) =
φ(θit[sit − 1])
φ(θitsit)
≥ piit
1− piit
1− ρt
ρt
(1)
Let sexpit denote the value of sit that solves (1) with equality. By the MLRP the
ratio L(s) ≡ Pr(s|ωt = 1)/Pr(s|ωt = 0) is increasing in s, so that i rules against the
Defendant whenever sit ≥ sexpit and in favor of the Defendant otherwise. This cutoff point
sexpit completely characterizes behavior in the expressive voting case. Therefore we can
write the likelihood of the justices’ votes in case t in the expressive voting model as
Pr(vt) ≡
∑
ωt
Pr(ωt)
n∏
i=1
[1− Φ(θit[sexpit − ωt])]vitΦ(θit[sexpit − ωt])1−vit (2)
In the strategic voting model, justices care about the ruling of the court. As a result,
any justice i then considers the implications of her vote assuming that she is pivotal for
the decision. (This supposition is not correct when the justice is not in fact pivotal, but
for the same reason these mistakes have no cost for the outcome-oriented justice.) Here,
the relevant information for justice i in case t is not only her private information sit, but
also the equilibrium information contained in the event that i is pivotal for the court’s
decision, given the equilibrium strategy profile followed by the remaining justices.
Let µjt : R→ [0, 1] denote the strategy of justice j, where µjt(sjt) ≡ Pr(vjt = 1|sjt).
Then (1) becomes
Pµ−i,t(pivit|ωt = 1)
Pµ−i,t(pivit|ωt = 0)
φ(θit[sit − 1])
φ(θitsit)
≥ piit
1− piit
1− ρt
ρt
(3)
As before, the MLRP implies that the best response to any strategy µ−i of the re-
maining justices is a cutoff strategy, such that i rules against the Defendant (µit(sit) = 1)
11In our setting, justices share common priors, but their ideological biases are captured by the pii
parameters. See Froeb and Kobayashi (1996) for a model where justices’ biases are manifested in their
priors. We also attempted to estimate a model where priors ρ, as well as bias pi, differed across justices
i and cases t. The resulting model was not well-identified – particularly, we could not disentangle the
effect of a variable on a justice’s priors vs his probability of voting for the plaintiff. As a result, we could
not obtained reliable estimates, and did not pursue this.
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if sit implies (3), and in favor of the Defendant (µit(sit) = 0) otherwise.
12 This in
turn implies that all responsive equilibria are cutoff equilibria; i.e., that any equilib-
rium is characterized by cutpoints s∗it for each justice i = 1, . . . , n such that justice
i votes against the Defendant if and only if sit ≥ s∗it. Now, given cutoff strategies,
Pr(vit = 1|ωt) =
∫
µit(s)φ(θit[s− ωt])ds = [1− Φ(θit[s∗it − ωt])]. Therefore from (3), and
letting CiR−1 denote the set of coalitions C ⊂ N \ i with R− 1 members, {s∗it}ni=1 is given
by the n equations
∑
C∈CR−1
(∏
j∈C [1− Φ(θj[s∗j − 1])]
)(∏
j 6=i,j /∈C Φ(θj[s
∗
j − 1])
)
∑
C∈CR−1
(∏
j∈C [1− Φ(θjs∗j)]
)(∏
j 6=i,j /∈C Φ(θjs
∗
j)
) φ(θit[s∗it − 1])
φ(θits∗it)
=
piit
1− piit
1− ρt
ρt
(4)
The cutpoints {s∗it} completely characterize equilibrium behavior. Therefore we can
write the likelihood of the justices’ votes in case t in the strategic voting case as
Pr(vt) ≡
∑
ωt
Pr(ωt)
n∏
i=1
[1− Φ(θit[s∗it − ωt])]vitΦ(θit[s∗it − ωt])1−vit (5)
The likelihood functions for the expressive and the strategic models (Eqs. 2,5) are
identical, except for the cutoff points: sexpt for the expressive model, and s
∗
t for the
strategic model. In principle, uniqueness of equilibrium is not guaranteed here, as any
set of cutpoints satisfying Eq. (4) for the strategic model (Eq. (1) for the expressive
model) constitute an equilibrium. The validity of our empirical results below do not
require a unique equilibrium; only that the same equilibrium is being played within the
data sample, so that the data can be pooled, as we have done, to estimate the model
parameters.13
4 Data
Our data derives from two sources. The first is a database of votes and case-specific
information from the Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database (Spaeth
12The proof of this result follows Duggan and Martinelli (2001), and is included in the online appendix
for convenience.
13 This is the same assumption which is required in the recent empirical literature on estimating
dynamic games (eg. Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007)). Another
set of papers have explicitly allowed for different equilibria to be manifested in different observations
of the dataset, resulting in only partial identification of model parameters (eg. Ciliberto and Tamer’s
2009 analysis of airline entry games). It would be challenging to implement such an approach in our
voting model, because there is already one case-specific unobservable (the state ωt). If in addition, the
equilibrium played were also assumed to vary across cases, there would be two case-specific unobservables,
which would raise some tricky identification issues.
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(2008)). The second is a database of justice specific information comes from the United
States Supreme Court Justice Database (Epstein, Walker, Staudt, Hendrickson, and
Roberts (2008)).
The first database begins with the first term of the Warren Court (1953), continues
through the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, and finishes with the 2008 term of the Roberts
Court. For our purposes, it will be useful to distinguish periods in which the composition
of the court remains unchanged (this is called a natural court in the literature). Given
changes in the composition of the court, this creates a number of natural courts per chief
justice. As we will explain later, we will focus on decisions in which nine justices vote.14
This restricts the list of natural courts in our sample to those with nine members. The
upper panel of Table 1 (in the Appendix) presents the lists of all such natural courts,
together with the number of cases per issu e and the percentage of decisions favoring the
Plaintiff.
We distinguish between four classes of issues: Criminal (includes Criminal Proce-
dure), Basic Rights (includes Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy,
and Judical Power), Economic (includes Economic Activity, Unions and Attorneys) and
Federal (includes Federalism, Interstate Relations, and Federal Taxation).15 We code
the type of Plaintiff and Defendant as one of three classes: U.S. Government (includes
the U.S. Government itself, Federal Agencies and Congress), Local Government (state
governments, local governments, boards of education, and state courts) and Private
Party (individuals, employees, businesses, nonprofit organizations, politicians, aliens and
sovereigns). We code the type of law under consideration as one of three classes: Judicial
Review (judicial review at the national level), Statu tory Interpretation (statutory con-
struction at the national level), and Others (includes judicial review at the state level,
supreme court supervision of lower federal courts, interpretation of administrative regu-
lation or rule or executive order, interpretation of state laws, and federal common law).
We also include information about whether lower courts agreed on a decision or not.
The second database provides us with information about each justice. We include
their political party affiliation at time of nomination, their prior judicial experience, and
the years of experience in the court at the time of the decision. We also include the
Segal-Cover (SC) score of the nominees ideology and qualifications.16 The lower panel of
Table 1 (in the Appendix) summarizes this information for each justice in our data.
14We include all such cases except memorandum cases and decrees, as well as those in which the court
has original jurisdiction. To avoid repetitions we set analu = 0 (this conforms to standard practice).
15A fifth residual category groups Miscellaneous cases (Spaeth’s issues 980-99).
16These scores were derived through content analyses of newspaper editorials written between the date
of the Presidents nomination and the date of the Senates final action over the nomination (see Segal and
Cover (1989), Segal, Cameron, and Cover (1990, 1992), and Epstein, Lindstadt, Segal, and Westerland
(2006)).
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5 Estimation: description and identification
In this section, we describe the estimation and identification of our model. Clearly, iden-
tification of our voting model from vote data alone is challenging: as Londregan (1999),
among others, have noted, from binary data on votes it is difficult to recover estimates
of the continuous preference distributions of voters, without additional modeling and/or
parametric restrictions. In our model, these additional restrictions come in the form of
the parametric restrictions on voters’ preferences and the information structure, detailed
in Section 3 above. Here, we present an argument as to the identification of these model
parameters from the observed vote data. We start with a more intuitive discussion of
identification, by relating the structural parameters to be estimated to observed quanti-
ties in the data. We then proceed to a more formal statistical discussion of identification.
At an intuitive level, the key for identification is that the common value induces
a correlation of votes in equilibrium: all justices tend to receive larger signals when
the law favors the Plaintiff, and all justices tend to receive smaller signals when the
law favors the Defendant. Suppose first that cases are homogeneous, so that justices’
types and prior are invariant across cases. If justices’ quality of information were large
relative to their bias, and the prior relatively uninformative (say pii ≈ 1/2 for all i and
ρ ≈ 1/2), the court would “flip-flop” evenly between unanimous pro-defendant and pro-
plaintiff decisions. Now suppose that instead ρ ≈ 2/3. Since in this case the law favors
the Plaintiff more frequently, justices will tend to receive large signals more frequently
(moreover, to compensate for the larger prior, justices will also use strategies that are
more favorable for the Plaintiff). As a result, the majority of the c ourt would rule for the
Plaintiff more often than before. Therefore, the frequency in which the majority decision
favors the Plaintiff tracks ρ: a larger frequency corresponds to a larger estimated prior ρ.17
Suppose next that we change the bias of one justice i in our previous example so that her
bias is large relative to the quality of her information. Then while all other justices will
alternate between sometimes finding for the Plaintiff and sometimes for the Defendant, i
will stay put in one decision. This illustrates that low variability in individual decisions
corresponds to large bias. Finally, return to the previous example in which all justices
are moderate. As we pointed out before, if the quality of information is sufficiently high
for all justices, then we would expect these to be unanimous votes. But as the quality
of information of some justices is lower, the se justices would disagree with the majority
more often. Thus justices with variable voting records who tend to be in the minority
are associated with a low quality of information.
Now, as it is, this identification scheme may seem unreasonable, because it appears to
penalize “maverick” justices who go against the grain by assigning them a low precision
parameter. For this reason, in the empirical work, we control for many case-specific
covariates, and take into account inherent differences among justices due to ideology,
judicial experience, etc. Therefore, justices with low θ’s are those who have attributes
that characterize justices who vote erratically, even after taking characteristics of the
case into account: these are not maverick justices, but rather inconsistent ones.
17Below, we discuss in more detail how to disentangle priors from case selection.
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A more formal argument. Our formal identification argument has two parts, which
will later be mimicked for estimation: first, we show that the justices’ priors and their
“reduced-form” voting probabilities are identified from the vote data; second, we show
that the parameters of voters’ preferences and the information structure are identified
from the reduced-form vote probabilities. For simplicity, we will assume here that all cases
are homogeneous, in the sense that all the parameters of the model, {(θi, pii)}ni=1, as well
as ρ, are assumed to be identical across all cases. However, these identification arguments
continue to hold if all the parameters, as well as Pr(vt), depend on characteristics of case
t, which we denote Xt. In our empirical work below, we will control for case heterogeneity
using a rich set of covariates, so that the justice-specific parameters θit and piit vary across
both justices i and cases t.
First step. We introduce the following notation:
Priors: ρ ≡ Pr(ωt = 1) Voting Probs.: γi,1 ≡ Pr(vit = 1|ωt = 1)
1− ρ = Pr(ωt = 0) γi,0 ≡ Pr(vit = 1|ωt = 0)
Given this notation, the first-step estimation problem (in both the expressive as well
as the strategic case) is to maximize the following reduced-form likelihood function for
the votes:
max
{γi,1,γi,0}ni=1,ρ
Pr(vt) = ρ
n∏
i=1
[
γviti,1 (1− γi,1)1−vit
]
+ (1− ρ)
n∏
i=1
[
γviti,0 (1− γi,0)1−vit
]
s.t. γi,1 ≥ γi,0, ∀i.
(6)
Conditional on the state ωt, the individual votes vit are independent across the justices
i. Thus, the vector of votes vt follows a multivariate mixture distribution, with mixing
probability ρ. Identification of the state-specific voting probabilities {γi,1, γi,0}ni=1 and
the mixing probability ρ are available in, eg., Hall and Zhou (2003), Hu (2008), and
Kasahara and Shimotsu (2007).
Intuitively, the unconditional correlation among justices’ votes is crucial to identi-
fication. If there were only one decision maker, for example, it would not be possible
to disentangle the independent effects of ideology and information.18 Moreover, the in-
equality γi,1 > γi,0, which is implied by the monotone likelihood ratio property, is also
important: without this assumption, the voting probabilities would only be identified
up to an arbitrary classification of ωt. This inequality resolves this classification prob-
lem by setting γi,1 (γi,0) equal to the maximum (minimum) of the two identified voting
probabilities.
18Specifically, for the n = 9 justices on the US Supreme Court, the vote vector vt can take 29 values;
with a large enough dataset, it is possible to estimate the probability that vt takes each of these values
by the empirical frequency. On the other hand, there are only 19 parameters (18 vote probabilities, and
ρ) to estimate. Since 29 >> 19, the relevant necessary condition for identification is satisfied.
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The above-cited papers contain constructive identification proofs, which can be di-
rectly mimicked for estimation. For our purposes, we found it more convenient to maxi-
mize the likelihood function (6) directly. This constituted the first step of our estimation
procedure.
Second step. Using the estimates of the two justice-specific vote probabilities γˆi,1 and
γˆi,0, from the first step, we recover the two structural parameters, pii and θi, for each
justice i. Recall our earlier assumptions that justice i’s private information is sit =
ωt +
1
θi
εit, with εit ∼ N (0, 1). Then γi,1 ≡ 1 − Φ (θi[s∗i − 1])) and γi,0 ≡ (1 − Φ(θis∗i )).
Solving these equations for θi and s
∗
i given γˆi,1 and γˆi,0 (and substituting Φ
−1(γi,1) =
−Φ−1(1− γi,1)) gives 19
θˆi = Φ
−1(1− γˆi,0)− Φ−1(1− γˆi,1); sˆi = Φ
−1(1− γˆi,0)
Φ−1(1− γˆi,0) + Φ−1(γˆi,1) (7)
Note that the estimate of θˆi, the precision of i’s information, is given by the difference
between the conditional probabilities of voting in favor of the Plaintiff when the law favors
the Plaintiff (ω = 1) and when the law favors the Defendant (ω = 0). This implies that
precision is increasing in the probability of correctly ruling in favor of the Plaintiff (γi,1),
and decreasing in γi,0, which is the probability of incorrectly ruling against the defendant.
This is very intuitive in light of the theoretical model.
The estimate of the equilibrium cutpoint, instead, is a decreasing function of the ratio
between Φ−1(γˆ1) and Φ−1(1− γˆ0). Thus sˆ is decreasing in the ratio of the probability of
voting correctly in favor of the Plaintiff (γ1) relative to the probability of correctly voting
in favor of the Defendant (1 − γ0). When this ratio is large, for instance – indicating a
bias towards the plaintiff – the cutpoint sˆ will be small, implying that the justice requires
a low informational threshold to vote in favor of the plaintiff.
In order to recover the bias parameter pii, we use the equilibrium voting condition,
which differs between the expressive and strategic models. In the case of the expressive
voting model, this is given by
φ(θi[sˆi − 1])
φ(θisˆi)
=
pˆiexpi
1− pˆiexpi
1− ρˆ
ρˆ
, (8)
while in the strategic voting model (with majority rule R) this is given by[
1− Φ(θi[sˆi − 1])
1− Φ(θisˆi)
]R−1 [
Φ(θi[sˆi − 1])
Φ(θisˆi)
]n−R
φ(θi[sˆi − 1])
φ(θisˆi)
=
pˆi∗i
1− pˆi∗i
1− ρˆ
ρˆ
(9)
19Note that for each justice, we use the estimates of γi,0, γi,1 to recover the two quantities θi and si.
For this reason, we consider a one-parameter specification of the information structure; with additional
parameters, we might not have identification.
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For both models, plugging in our estimates of θi and sˆi into the appropriate equilibrium
condition allows us to recover estimates of pˆiexpi and pˆi
∗
i for the expressive and strategic
models, respectively.
Note that, in recovering θi, it was not necessary to specify whether justices vote
expressively or strategically. An assumption regarding strategic or expressive voting
is required only for recovering pii. This distinction between θi and pii is a remarkable
property of this problem. It implies that the precision estimate is independent of whether
justices care about the court ruling or about their own vote being correct, and therefore
of whether justices use the information contained in the event of them being pivotal or
simply best respond to their own private information.
5.1 Estimation: Accommodating case and justice heterogeneity
While our foregoing discussion of identification assumed that all cases are homogeneous,
this was mainly for convenience, and our empirical model accommodates case-level het-
erogeneity by allowing the reduced-form parameters of the model, which are recovered
in the first step of the estimation procedure, to depend quite flexibly on observable char-
acteristics Xt. Specifically, we parameterize justices’ priors in case t, ρt ≡ Pr(ωt = 1), as
a logit probability which depends on the characteristics Xt:
ρ(Xt; β) ≡ exp(X
′
tβ)
1 + exp(X ′tβ)
, ∈ [0, 1].
Once the prior probability ρt varies across cases, so will the equilibrium strategies s
∗
it, and
hence so will the justice-specific conditional probabilities of ruling against the Defendant
γit,1 and γit,0. Because of this, the model becomes more difficult. One possibility is to
undertake “direct” estimation where, for each value of the parameters, we need to solve for
the equilibrium cutpoints using equations (4) for each justice and each case. Obviously,
this is computationally quite cumbersome. Therefore, we propose a procedure that builds
on our previous methodology. Since we know that the heterogeneous cases will cause the
justice-specific probabilities of ruling in favor of the Plaintiff to vary across cases, we
parameterize these in the following way, which also restricts γi,t,1 ≥ γi,t,0, for all Xt:
γi,0(ζ, η) =
exp(Z ′iζ +X
′
tη)
1 + exp(Z ′iζ +X
′
tη)
, ∈ [0, 1];
γi,1(ζ, η, α, δ) =
γi,0 + exp(Z
′
iα +X
′
tδ)
1 + exp(Z ′iα +X
′
tδ)
, ∈ [γi,0(ζ, η), 1].
(10)
In the first stage, we estimate the parameters (β, δ, η) as well as the justice-specific
variables (αi, ζi) for i = 1, . . . , n. For this, we maximize the following likelihood function
max
α,β,ζ,η,δ
∑
t
log
[
ρ(Xt; β) ·
n∏
i=1
{
γi,1(ζ, η, α, δ)
vit(1− γi,1(ζ, η, α, δ))1−vit
}
+(1− ρ(Xt; β)) ·
n∏
i=1
{
γi,0(ζ, η)
vit(1− γi,0(ζ, η))1−vit
}]
.
(11)
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For the second stage, we use the predicted values of γi,t,1 and γi,t,0 to recover case and
justice specific values of θit and s
∗
it, using the equations in (7). We can then compute the
bias estimates solving the n equations (4) for the strategic voting model, or (1) (with
equality) for the expressive voting model. Note that, when the voting probabilities γi.0
and γi,1 are case-specific and depend on the covariates X and Z, then so will the model
parameters θit and piit.
Disentangling Priors and Endogenous Case Selection. Up to now, we have im-
plicitly assumed that all the cases heard by the Court are exogenously chosen; i.e., we
have not explicitly modeled an agenda-setting stage. However, it is well-known that
case selection can be endogenous, both because the Supreme Court must decide (via a
vote) whether or not to “grant cert” (that is, to hear) a case that has been brought to
its attention, and also because petitioners and lower courts may selectively recommend
cases to the Supreme Court for which, given the ideological leanings of the justices, the
plaintiff has a high probability of winning.20
In our empirical model, this endogenous case selection is not explicitly accommodated,
and will thus be captured in the parameter ρ describing justices’ common prior beliefs
about the “right” judgment in the cases. To see this intuitively, consider the likelihood
problem (11). Note that – for given covariates Xt – the parameter estimates β in ρ(Xt, β)
should be set so that ρ(Xt, β) is high (resp. low) when justices vote more often in favor
of (resp. against) the plaintiff.
This suggests that in general it will be difficult to distinguish a shift in justices’ prior
beliefs (about randomly assigned cases) from case selection, because both will lead, all
else equal, to a higher probability of voting in favor of the plaintiff. This difficulty in
disentangling beliefs and case selection implies that the estimates of ρ|Xt should not be
taken out of the context of those courts for which it was computed. On the other hand,
letting ρ vary in response to the voting data allows us to “control” for case selection.
To capture this we include in Xt both variables that capture justices’ priors and case
selection. In particular, to capture agenda-setting considerations we include chief justice
dummies in Xt. Later, we will gauge the importance of agenda-setting by examining the
coefficients on these variables.
6 Results
In this section, we describe our results for the heterogeneous model described above.
As before, we restrict attention to cases in which all nine justices voted.21 The covari-
20See Cameron, Segal, and Songer (2000) and Daughety and Reinganum (2006) for more information
on the Supreme Court case selection process.
21Note that the equilibrium cutpoint of each justice will be different for each different composition
of the voting members of the court, implying different conditional probabilities of ruling in favor of the
Plaintiff in each state for each configuration of voting members, even fixing the covariates Xt. Including
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ates are those that were described in Section 4. As case-specific covariates, we include
characteristics of the Plaintiff and the Defendant (whether Plaintiff and Defendant are a
Local Government, the Federal Government, or private parties), the authority for deci-
sion (whether this is a case that involves the interpretation of a Federal Law, a challenge
that a Federal Law is unconstitutional, or others) , and the disposition of the case by
lower courts (whether the lower courts agree or not). To further control for endogenous
case selection, we also include the identity of the chief justice at the time of consider-
ation of the case (Warren, Burger, Rehnquist, or Roberts). In order to allow maximal
flexibility in the order of justices’ bias along different issues, we estimate the model sep-
arately for cases involving Basic Rights, Economic, Criminal, and Federal issues.22 As
justice-specific covariates we include the number of years of prior judicial experience, the
political party of the President that nominated the justice (Democratic or Republican
Nominee), and the Segal-Cover measures of ideology and quality. We also include three
variables that vary per case and justice. These are each justice’s years of experience at
the Court at the time of the ruling, and, for each justice i, the average Segal-Cover scores
of justices other than i sitting in the Court that ruled in the case.
Table 2 presents the “first stage” MLE estimates of the coefficients of the common
prior function ρ(Xt), and of the state-contingent probabilities of ruling against the De-
fendant γ0(Xt, Zit) and γ1(Xt, Zit). Note that for all issues other than Federal (for which
the small sample size leads to uniformly larger standard errors), all the coefficients of
the case-specific and justice-specific variables are statistically significant in the specifica-
tion of at least one of our first-stage parameters. Either the justices’ common prior that
the Plaintiff should win the case, or the individual probabilities of ruling correctly and
incorrectly in favor of the Plaintiff are significantly different depending on whether the
Plaintiff or the Defendant are themselves the Federal Government, a Local Government,
or a private party, on whether previous courts agreed on a ruling or not, etc.
The coefficients on the average SC quality and ideology measures for the other justices
(shaded in Table 2), merit additional discussion. Under simple expressive voting, a
justice’s vote is not affected by her colleagues, so that the coefficients on these covariates
should be zero. Under strategic voting, however, the justices’ votes are interdependent,
and these coefficients should be significantly nonzero. Including the covariates for the
average Segal-Cover scores for the other justices therefore allows us to informally test the
strategic vs. the expressive voting model. We see that for the basic rights and criminal
cases, these variables are significant, but not in the other cases. This suggests that for
the two largest subsets of the cases, the strategic voting model is appropriate.
[Table 2 about here]
only the votes in which all justices vote therefore dramatically reduces the number of parameters to be
estimated. This still leaves a significant number of cases in the sample (see Table 1).
22The results of carrying out our estimation pooling all votes and introducing “issue” as an additional
covariate are otherwise similar to the issue-by-issue estimation (results are available from the authors
upon request).
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6.1 The Value of Information in the Court
Given the first stage coefficients we can compute, for any case t with characteristics Xt,
the common prior ρt = ρ(Xt), as well as the conditional probabilities γi,t,0 = γ0(Xt, Zit)
and γi,t,1 = γ1(Xt, Zit) that a justice with characteristics Zit in case t rules against the
Defendant in each state of nature. We can then use the predicted values of γi,t,1 and γi,t,0
to recover case and justice specific values of s∗it, and the “deep parameters” θit and piit
(for both the strategic and the expressive voting models). In particular, we can do this
for cases with characteristics Xt = x and the actual justices and courts observed in the
realized history. To describe the main results we will focus for the most part on cases of
statutory interpretation in which both the Plaintiff and the Defendant are private parties,
and in which lower courts have agreed on a rulin g. We then consider comparative statics
from this initial exercise.
To reinforce the logic of the model, we begin by presenting the complete set of esti-
mates for a single court. Table 3 presents the estimates for each issue for the longest-
lasting natural court in our data: REHN7, with chief justice Rehnquist, between 1994
and 2004. For each parameter, standard errors (computed using the Delta method) are
given in parentheses.
[Table 3 about here]
For each issue, we indicate the MLE estimate of the common prior probability that
the law favors the Plaintiff. Thus in Criminal Procedure the prior is lower than in all
other issues, and moreover favors the Defendant (ρ = 0.333).23 In all other issues the
prior favors the Plaintiff, and is most favorable to the Plaintiff in Economics (ρ = 0.610).
The first two columns present the MLE estimates of the probability that justice i
rules in favor of the Plaintiff when the law favors the Defendant (γit0) and when the
law favors the Plaintiff (γit1). Thus, taking Economics for example, justice Breyer had
a probability of γit1 = 0.94 of correctly ruling for the Plaintiff, and a probability of
1 − γit0 = 1 − 0.14 = 0.86 of correctly ruling in favor of the Defendant. Column 3
presents the estimate of the informativeness or precision of each justice’s signal. As we
pointed out earlier, this is an increasing function of the difference between the probability
that justice i rules in favor of the Plaintiff when the law favors the Plaintiff and when
the law favors the Defendant. The larger precision for Breyer relative to Stevens in
Economics, for example, reflects both a higher probability of ruling for the Plaintiff when
the law favors the Plaintiff (0.94 vs 0.82) and a smaller probability of ruling for the
Plaintiff when the law favors the Defendant (0.14 vs 0.16).
23However it should be noted that most frequently, Criminal Procedure cases have the Government as
Plaintiff or Defendant (as opposed to here, where we consider both Plaintiff and Defendant to be private
parties). When we condition for the US Government as Plaintiff, the prior belief that the Plaintiff is
right increases to ρ = 0.915 for the REHN7 court. We return to this later in the paper.
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The fourth column presents the equilibrium cutpoint. Thus, taking again Economics
for example, Justice Breyer would vote for the Plaintiff after observing a signal si ≥ 0.42,
but it would take more evidence (a signal above 0.48) for Justice Souter to rule in favor
of the Plaintiff, and even more for Justice Stevens to vote in the same way (a signal above
0.52). This results from three factors. The first is the precision of private information.
According to the estimates, Breyer has a more precise signal than Souter, who in turn
has a more precise signal than Stevens. Thus the same evidence has different value for
different justices. The second factor is the common prior ρ, which as we mentioned in
this case “stacks the deck” in favor of the plaintiff. The third is the bias of the justice in
question (and in the strategic voting model, also of the remaining justices in the court,
through their equilibrium strategy s∗−i). The justices’ bias are shown in c olumns 5 and
6 in the table. Here Justice Breyer is more moderate (piexpBRE = 0.47) than Justice Souter
(piexpSOU = 0.58). Justice Stevens requires more evidence (a belief of at least 0.63 that the
law favors the Plaintiff) to rule in favor of the Plaintiff in this class of cases.
Given these estimates, we can compute our measure of the value of information in
the court, FLEX. This is the probability that justice i votes differently than what she
would have voted for in the absence of her private case information. To compute this, we
first calculate how each justice would have voted with no private information. From (1),
this is simply vit = 1 if ρ ≥ pii and vit = 0 otherwise (vote for the Plaintiff if the public
information, as summarized by ρ, outweights the private bias pii). Then we compare
this initial leaning to the probability of voting differently after observing her private
information; i.e., FLEX measures the probability that a justice would “change her mind”
after observing her private information (vote for the Defendant even when ρ ≥ pii, or for
the Plaintiff even when ρ < pii):
FLEXi =
{
ρΦ(θi[s
∗
i − 1]) + (1− ρ)Φ(θis∗i ) if ρ ≥ pii
ρ[1− Φ(θi[s∗i − 1])] + (1− ρ)[1− Φ(θis∗i )] if ρ < pii. (12)
Note that FLEX is bounded between zero and one, and takes a value of zero for indi-
viduals with extremely large biases either for the Plaintiff (pi → 0) or for the Defendant
(pi → 1). Note also that the computation of FLEX for the expressive and strategic voting
models differ only in whether we use piexpi or pi
∗
i to evaluate whether ρ ≥ pii or ρ ≤ pii.
The reason for this is that the equilibrium cutpoint s∗i that is recovered from the data is
not determined by whether we use the expressive or strategic voting models. Together
with the data, the two models imply the same s∗i and θi, and differ only in the biases
pii that rationalize these quantities. As a result, in practical terms this means that the
expressive and strategic FLEX scores for any given justice and any given realization of
the covariates Xt are very often identical.
24
Table 4 contains the average FLEX scores for each justice across different courts and
issues. From a casual perusal of the FLEX scores, we see that justices tend to follow
their initial leanings: FLEX scores are typically below 1/2, and thus, more often than
24If instead we were initially given values of {pii, θi} and ρ, then the two models would imply a different
equilibrium cutpoint s∗i , and FLEX scores in the two models would differ significantly.
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not, justices’ votes reflect their initial consideration of the case, based on bias and prior
alone. Having said this, FLEX scores are relatively large: on average, the probability of
voting differently than what they would have voted for in the absence of case information
is about 44%.
[Table 4 about here]
Average FLEX scores display a significant variation across justices. The top five
average FLEX scores in our sample are between 48% and 53% and the bottom five
average FLEX scores in our sample are between 36% and 39%. Most justices among
those with the lowest average FLEX scores are (or were) strong representatives of a
liberal judicial philosophy (clearly Ginsburg, Goldberg and Breyer; also arguably Minton,
who during his political career defended New Deal legislation with the statement “You
cannot eat the Constitution”). Justices with the highest average FLEX scores are not
necessarily judicially conservative, but have other noteworthy characteristics. Two of
them – Warren and Rehnquist – were chief justices (Chief Justice Burger is also among
the highest FLEX scores; Chief Justice Roberts, on the other hand, is in the bottom
half of the distribution). A third, Justice Hugo Black, was a very influential advocate of
textualism (a legal philosophy restricting heavily the flexibility in the interpretation of
the law). A fourth justice in this top class is Justice Whittaker. Charles Whitakker served
for a relatively short period of time (from 1957 to 1962) and was considered a “swing
vote” on a closely divided Supreme Court. This is also the case of Justice O’Connor,
who also has a relatively high average FLEX score (the highest among justices appointed
after 1987).
Table 4 also illustrates a substantial variation of FLEX scores between issue areas.
This is consistent with the literature and a cursory glance at the raw data, both of which
suggest that we should expect the bias and quality of information to vary greatly across
different issues. Most notably, the typical FLEX score in Basic Rights cases (38%) is
substantially lower than in all other areas, which is consistent with the basic notion that
the value of information in the court is lower in areas in which ideological considerations
tend to weigh more heavily – such as Basic Rights.25
Politicization of Nominations and the Value of Information in the Court. We
mentioned above that three of the four chief justices in our sample (Warren, Burger and
Rehnquist) have relatively high FLEX scores (all three of them are in the top 7 scores).
25The table shows a relatively large average bias in favor of the plaintiff in Criminal cases. It should
be noted, though, that most criminal cases do not have a private Plaintiff pitted against a private
Defendant as we are maintaining here for consistency of the comparison. Instead most cases involve
either the Federal or a Local Government facing a private party. As we will show below, the distinction
turns out to be important, since having the Federal government as Plaintiff increases the bias in criminal
cases by around 0.7 (see Figure 3). Note that even with this clarification, Criminal cases show a larger
overall bias for one of the sides in the dispute.
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The exception is Chief Justice Roberts, who was appointed in 2005. Roberts’ relatively
low score obtains even if he has a relatively high quality of information in most issues. Is
this a reflection of a wider change in the type of justice appointed to the Supreme Court?
According to many observers, the defeat of Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme
Court in 1987 marked a significant change in how nominations are considered in the
Senate. Epstein, Lindstadt, Segal, and Westerland (2006) summarize this noting that “[a]
near-universal consensus exists that the nomination of Robert Bork in 1987 triggered a
new regime in the Senate’s voting over presidential nominees – a regime that deemphasizes
ethics, competence, and integrity, and stresses instead politics, philosophy and ideology.”
Their own analysis of the confirmation decisions of US senators confirms this conventional
wisdom. They argue, however, that while the importance of ideology has reached new
heights since Bork’s nomination, the Senate’s emphasis on this factor began earlier, in
the 1950’s.
Figure 1 allows us to complement this analysis by illustrating the variation in the
bias, precision of information, and FLEX scores of Supreme Court justices throughout
time.
[Figure 1 about here]
The results in Figure 1 partially confirm these arguments. For economics and feder-
alism cases, FLEX scores have, indeed, fallen about 40% from the Warren to the Roberts
courts. For the other two types of cases (basic rights and criminal), however, we see a
marked decrease in FLEX only during the Rehnquist and Roberts courts: this decrease
was about 16% in criminal cases, and around 20% in basic rights cases. Thus, our results
suggest that the increased politicization of the Supreme Court appointment process has
become uniformly marked only in the last quarter-century, following the failed nomi-
nation of justice Bork (i.e., within the Rehnquist and Roberts courts). Indeed, Justice
Stevens, who has served since the Ford presidency, is seen by some as the last link to
an era “before the Reagan years, when confirmations became contested territory in the
culture wars.”26 Moreover , for basic rights and criminal cases, FLEX during the current
Roberts court is at the same level as in the Warren Court, so that for these two types of
cases, the recent decrease in FLEX reversed a trend towards greater value of information
in the court which began in the Burger courts.
Separation of Powers. In the presentation of results so far, we fixed both Plaintiffs
and Defendants to be private parties. Here we focus on whether having the US Govern-
ment or a Local Government as a Plaintiff affects the value of information in the court,
and if so, how. We then also consider here whether cases involving the constitutionality of
government acts have important differences from cases of interpretation of laws enacted
by Congress.
26See Jeffrey Toobin, “After Stevens”, in New Yorker, cover article (03/22/2010).
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Having the Government as Plaintiff changes the results in two ways. The first is
by changing justices’ common prior beliefs: across all issues, justices attach a higher
probability to the government being right than they do a private party. The difference
is substantial in Criminal Procedure (0.54) and Basic Rights (0.21), and more modest
in Economics and Federalism (0.03).27 Recall however that not only the prior, but
also the bias and quality of information are functions of justice-specific and case-specific
characteristics. As a result, a change as the one we are considering here, in the identity
of the Plaintiff, also leads to a change in the bias and precision of each justice. For
example, within Basic Rights cases (all) justices require more evidence to rule in favor of
the Government than what they would require in the case of a private party.
In Figure 2 we generalize this comparison. In order to summarize this information
efficiently, we proceed as follows. We first compute, for each justice and issue class, the
differential bias and FLEX scores when the Plaintiff is the US Government (or a Local
Government) and when the Plaintiff is a private party. We then report in the top two
panels of Figure 2 the median and 25-75 percentiles of the distribution of these changes
at the individual justice level.
[Figure 2 about here]
The figure shows that in some issue areas, the change in type of Plaintiff has a large
effect on justices’ preferences. In particular, changing the Plaintiff from a private party
to the US (local) Government leads to a median increase of 0.29 (0.41) in piexp in Basic
Rights, and to a median increase of 0.72 (0.73) in piexp in Criminal cases. Now recall that
our measure of ideological bias (pii) is the parameter in justices’ preferences that quantifies
the relative cost of ruling incorrectly against the defendant (pii) vis a vis ruling incorrectly
against the plaintiff (1 − pii). Moreover pii also has a second direct interpretation: it is
the cutpoint such that justice i will rule in favor of the plaintiff whenever the probability
that the law favors the plaintiff is above pii. Thus justices appear to have more stringent
requirements for the Government, in particular within Criminal Procedure.
In the lower panels of Figure 2, we focus on whether judicial review cases have impor-
tant differences from cases of statutory interpretation. It is important to keep in mind
here that most cases of judicial review are in the Basic Rights and Criminal issues. The
change appears to have no effect on either bias or FLEX scores within Criminal Proce-
dure. Within Basic Rights cases, however, justices do appear to be more open-minded
in cases that merit judicial review.
27This is also true for Local Government In Basic Rights (0.16), Economics (0.17), and Criminal
Procedure (0.53). In Federalism, however, having a Local Government as plaintiff reduces ρ by 0.15.
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6.2 Further results and specification checks
6.2.1 Agenda Setting
As we mentioned before, the parameter ρ describing justices’ common prior beliefs will
capture both justices’ prior beliefs about randomly assigned cases and changes due to
endogenous case selection. With this in mind, we included the identify of the chief justice
as an additional covariate, thus capturing one important component of agenda-setting:
the chief justice’s influence on the cases that are taken up by the Supreme Court.
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 shows the difference between the prior ρ in each issue area in the Burger,
Rehnquist and Roberts’ courts and the Warren court. If there were no case selection,
we would expect these differences to be zero. This is not the case. Table 2 shows that
the coefficients for the chief justice dummies are significant. Figure 3 shows that the this
agenda-setting effect is not negligible, in particular within Economics, where it ranges
from a 7% difference (in the Burger court) to a 14% difference (in the Roberts court).
6.2.2 Communication
In our formal model, as well as in our empirical exercise, we assumed that justices’
private signals are independent conditional on the state. This rules out the possibility
of transmission of information through communication prior to the vote. In the Court,
however, justices have many opportunities to exchange information about each case.
The question here is whether justices, as strategic agents who care about the collective
decision, will use pre-vote deliberation to communicate information to their peers, or
whether they will use these arguments to try to influence their opinion, possibly not
revealing some information that can be harmful to their case, or exaggerating evidence
one way or the other. While the incentive to do so is small when interests are well
aligned (Coughlan (2000)), this is not the case when there is (interim) disagreement, as
in the setting consider here. This makes truthful revelation of information more difficult,
as is illustrated in the analysis of Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005, 2006) (see also
Li, Rosen, and Suen (2001) and Doraszelski, Gerardi, and Squintani (2003)). Here we
take an empirical perspective on the issue. To consider the possibility of informative
pre-vote deliberation in the U.S. Supreme Court, we contrast voting records with the
empirical implications of the model assuming that jus tices do in fact share their private
information with one another.
A first, informal test, is to look at unanimous votes: if pooling of private information
is strong enough to overwhelm private biases, all justices should vote in the same way, and
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thus all (or most) votes should be unanimous.28 This is not, however, what we observe in
the data: more than 72% of the rulings in Criminal issues are decided by non-unanimous
votes. Similarly , 60% of the rulings in Basic Rights, 58% of the rulings in Economics,
and 56% of the rulings in Federal issues are decided by non-unanimous votes. Moreover,
the proportion of cases decided by a small majority (say either a 5-4 vote or a 6-3 vote) is
47% in Criminal issues, 37% in Basic Rights, 34% in Economics, and 28% in Federalism.
Thus, while a non trivial number of cases are decided unanimously, this occurrence is far
from prevalent.
Using unanimous votes only to gauge the effect of pre-vote deliberation on outcomes is
not entirely satisfactory, as it doesn’t allow the possibility that after all the information is
transmitted, some justices still disagree. We consider this in turn. Suppose that, contrary
to our benchmark model, justices’ pool their private information through deliberation.
Formally, this is equivalent to a model where all justices observe the same public signal
prior to their vote. This model has testable implications: in particular, if in a case t
with characteristics Xt justice i votes for the Plaintiff and justice j 6= i votes for the
Defendant, this reveals that, given Xt, justice i is more biased than justice j towards
the plaintiff. Now consider a second case t′ with the same characteristics, Xt′ = Xt, so
that the biases of justices i and j are the same in case t′ as in case t. These two justices
(i) can vote as they did in t, or (ii) can both vote for the Plaintiff (if they observed a
strong public signal in favor of the Plaintiff) or (iii) can both vote for the Defendant (if
they observed a strong public signal in favor of the Defendant). However, it cannot be
that justice i votes for the Defendant and justice j 6= i votes for the Plaintiff, as this
would imply that justice i is more biased than justice j towards the defendant, which
contradicts her vote in case t.
Hence, observations of such “pairwise flip-flops” would violate the pre-vote deliber-
ation model, and we search for pairwise violations of this kind. In order to rule out
variation that is not related to case-specific information, we consider sets of similar cases
(six in all) and fix the composition of the court. To have as many observations as possible,
we consider REHN7 (Rehnquist 1994-2004), the natural court with most observations in
our sample. The results are presented in Table 5.
[Table 5 about here]
With nine justices in the court, there are 72 = N×(N−1) pairs. Most classes of cases
present a significant number of violations. Consider for example the first class of cases
(private Defendant vs private Plaintiff, lower courts agree, statutory interpretation).
28An alternative rationale to focus on unanimous votes follows from the analysis of Gerardi and Yariv
(2007). If agents send not only relevant information, but also other (random) messages, which the
group uses to define correlated voting strategies (here unanimous votes), the set of equilibria expands
dramatically. Gerardi and Yariv (2007) show (using in fact unanimous votes at the voting stage) that
every outcome that can be implemented with a non-unanimous voting rule r can also be implemented
(as a sequential equilibrium of a cheap talk extension of the voting game) with a non-unanimous rule r′.
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Using the information of the 41 Basic Rights cases in this class, we find 68 pairwise
violations among the 72 pairings. Similarly, there are 44 violations in Economics, 24 in
Criminal cases, and 56 in Federalism cases. The remaining classes of cases highlight a
similar result. All in all, the large number of violations present strong evidence against
the hypothesis of substantial sharing of information through deliberation.29
6.2.3 Does bias capture political ideology?
Throughout this paper, we used the terminology “bias” to denote the parameters piit,
describing justice i’s propensity to rule for the plaintiff in case t: the size of the hurdle
that information in favor of the Plaintiff has to overcome to lead to a decision in favor
of the Plaintiff. Is this bias related at all to political ideology, along the conventional
“liberal/conservative” spectrum? To check this, we also estimated a model where we
included variables describing whether the Plaintiff’s position in each case is classified
as a “liberal” or “conservative” cause. Because under this hypothesis Democratic and
Republican justices would be expected to respond differently when voting for the Plaintiff
is a liberal vote, we included an interaction term for these variables.
Figure 3 plots the estimated bias of each justice when the Plaintiff’s position is a
liberal cause (in the horizontal axis) and when the Plaintiff’s position is a conservative
cause (in the vertical axis). The figure reports results for the Basic Rights and Economics
cases, were ideological concerns can be expected to play a more prominent role.
[Figure 3 about here]
The filled squares illustrate the bias of republican justices in Economics. The fact
that these points are below the 45 degree line indicates that within Economic cases,
Republican justices are more inclined to rule in favor of the Defendant when voting for
the Defendant is a conservative vote. In particular, the average bias of Republican justices
in Economics changes from 0.42 (moderately in favor of the Plaintiff) when voting for
the Plaintiff is a conservative vote to 0.62 (moderately in favor of the Defendant) when
supporting the Defendant is a conservative vote. In contrast, Democratic justices’s bias in
Economic cases is basically unaffected by this distinction. In Basic Rights’ cases, instead,
all justices appear to be more inclined to rule in favor of the Plaintiff when voting for the
Plaintiff is a liberal vote. This effect is marginally stronger for Democratic justices.30
29A second institutional consideration related to communication is that in contrast with our model –
in which we assumed that voting takes place simultaneously – justices vote in sequence, with the chief
justice voting first, followed by the associate justices in order of seniori ty. This could potentially have
an effect in terms of transmission of information. The question is more subtle than what it seems at first
sight because, as argued in Dekel and Piccione (2000), observing the sequence of votes might not offer
any additional useful information if voters condition on the event of being pivotal, as in the strategic
voting model. In our case, however, justices are heterogeneous, so observing the voting sequence might
still reveal useful information. We leave this interesting aspect for future research.
30The coefficient estimates for this model are not reported here for the sake of brevity, but are available
from the authors upon request.
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These results suggest that while in our model bias can reflect a variety of sources, it
also partly incorporates the issues associated with political ideology along the conven-
tional “liberal/conservative” spectrum, especially within economics cases. We leave a
further exploration of this connection for future research.
6.3 Mistakes and Implications for Institutional Design
In any given case, the Court must arrive at a single ruling. The Court being a collective
body, this single ruling requires aggregating the individual opinions in one way or the
other. The Supreme Court aggregates the individual votes of its members by simple
majority rule. In this section we address two questions. First, we provide a measure of
performance: what is the probability that the court reaches a decision that is contrary to
the true meaning of the law? Second, we ask whether this performance would improve
or decline if the court were to use a different mechanism for aggregating the votes of
individual justices. In particular, we compare the performance of the court with a coun-
terfactual scenario in which ruling against the Defendant requires the unanimous consent
of the justices.
We begin by computing the probability of mistakes in the Court. Note that for any
given case characteristics X, our first stage estimates provide the individual probabilities
of ruling for the Defendant when the law favors the Plaintiff (1−γi,1), and for the Plaintiff
when the law favors the Defendant, (γi,0). (We drop the obvious dependence on X to
simplify notation.) For a simple majority rule, we then use these individual conditional
probabilities to compute the probability that the Court will rule for the Defendant when
the law favors the Plaintiff, Pr(v = d|ω = 1), and for the Plaintiff when the law favors
the Defendant, Pr(v = p|ω = 0).31 Given a prior ρ, we can then compute the total
probability of an incorrect ruling for the Supreme Court as
βSC = ρPr(v = d|ω = 1) + (1− ρ) Pr(v = p|ω = 0)
The upper panel of Figure 4 shows βSC and Pr(v = p|ω = 0) for Basic Rights issues,
for both the strategic and expressive voting models. (As before, for exposition purposes
here we focus on private parties, lower courts agree, statutory interpretation.) The figure
shows two distinct patterns of mistakes throughout the sample. In the Warren courts and
the first Burger court in the sample (BURG2) the total probability of error βSC fluctuates
between 2 % and 6 %, and exceeds 10% in some natural courts (WAR1, WAR3, WAR8,
WAR9). Instead, in the remaining Burger courts and in the Rehnquist and Roberts
courts, βSC is bounded below 2%. The error rate is driven by the probability of ruling
incorrectly in favor of the Plaintiff (bars in the figure). This exceeds 10% for several
Warren courts, and is bounded below 4% from BURG4 on.
31Letting C(k) denote the set of coalitions with exactly k members, Pr(v = d|ω = 1) =∑9
k=5
∑
C∈C(k)
∏
i∈C(1−γi,1)
∏
i/∈C γi,1, and Pr(v = p|ω = 0) =
∑9
k=5
∑
C∈C(k)
∏
i∈C γi,0
∏
i/∈C(1−γi,0).
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[Figure 4 about here]
How do these compare with performance under a unanimity rule? To evaluate this,
we need to compute the probability of mistakes under unanimity. Now, in the expressive
voting model, this is straightforward. Here behavior is unaffected by the aggregation
mechanism, and therefore so are the individual strategy cutpoints and conditional prob-
abilities. The only change is in the aggregation rule. Here the probability of the court
ruling for the Defendant when the law favors the Plaintiff is 1 −∏9i=1(1 − γi,1) and the
probability of the court ruling for the Plaintiff when the law favors the Defendant is∏9
i=1 γi,0. Thus the total probability of an incorrect ruling for the Supreme Court under
unanimity rule in the expressive voting model is βUexp
βUexp = ρ
[
1−
9∏
i=1
(1− γi,1)
]
+ (1− ρ)
[
9∏
i=1
γi,0
]
In the strategic voting model, the computation of the total probability of mistakes
under unanimity rule requires an additional step because the aggregation mechanism now
clearly affects equilibrium behavior. Thus we cannot use the conditional probabilities of
ruling for the Defendant recovered from justices’ votes, but rather we must recompute the
behavioral probabilities that are consistent with equilibrium behavior under unanimity.
Fortunately, this is not difficult to do given our previous results. Given our estimates
{(pi∗i , θi)} we can use Eq. (4) with R to compute the equilibrium strategy cutpoints s∗∗i
consistent with unanimity rule. Given s∗∗, we can then compute γ∗∗i,1 = 1−Φ(θi[s∗∗i − 1])
and γ∗∗i,0 = 1−Φ(θis∗∗i ). Then the total probability of an incorrect ruling for the Supreme
Court under unanimity rule in the strategic voting model βU∗ is
βU∗ = ρ
[
1−
9∏
i=1
(1− γ∗∗i,1)
]
+ (1− ρ)
[
9∏
i=1
γ∗∗i,0
]
The lower panel of Figure 4 puts everything together (again, for Basic Rights issues).
Unanimity rule considerably increases total error rates in comparison to simple majority
rule. Consider first the expressive voting model. While here justices do not change their
voting behavior in response to the voting rule, unanimity requires the vote of all nine
justices to reach a decision in favor of the Plaintiff. As a result, unanimity reduces the
probability of ruling incorrectly in favor of the Plaintiff to insignificant levels, but also
increases considerably the probability of ruling incorrectly in favor of the Defendant,
and leads to a large total probability of error (including, and especially in, the Burger,
Rehnquist and Roberts courts). In the strategic voting model, instead, the change in
justices’ voting strategy in response to the alternative decision rule leads to an increase
in the probability of ruling incorrectly in favor of the Plaintiff vis a vis majority rule, a
nd with it to an increase in the total probability of error, especially in the Warren courts.
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This basic conclusion holds across all issue areas (results are available from the au-
thors upon request). The results confirm in this application with small committees and
heterogeneous agents the asymptotic results of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and
Duggan and Martinelli (2001) (see also Meirowitz (2002)).
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented results from a voting model for the US Supreme Court in
which votes reflect both justices’ personal ideologies, as well as their endeavor to “get it
right”: to rule according to an accurate and faithful interpretation of the law as it applies
to the specifics of each case. In this context, we study whether case information has
enough power to overturn the prior biases and ideological considerations of the justices.
To tackle this question, we introduce a new estimation approach that allows us to
handle our model of voting with common values and strategic agents. The model is
estimated in two steps. In the first step, using the observed votes, we estimate a “reduced-
form” model of justices’ probabilities of voting in favor of the Plaintiff when the law favors
the Plaintiff and when the law favors the Defendant. In the second step, we recover the
structural parameters characterizing justices’ preferences and information services, using
the equilibrium conditions in the voting model.
Our methodology allows us to disentangle the effects of ideology and information for
each justice, and then to quantify the tradeoffs between ideology and information in the
court. Our results, as encapsulated in our FLEX measure, indicate a substantial value of
information: in roughly 44% of cases, justices’ initial leanings – which reflect their priors
or their ideological biases – are changed by the case-specific private information of the
justices. Moreover, the temporal evolution of FLEX scores suggest that the increased
politicization of the Supreme Court appointment process pointed out by the literature has
become uniformly marked only in the last quarter-century, following the failed nomination
of justice Bork (i.e., within the Rehnquist and Roberts courts).
We close with a remark about the limitations of our results. Possibly the most
important of these is that our analysis paints a necessarily incomplete picture of the
court. In this paper, we have concentrated exclusively on the collective decision about
the disposition of the case, but abstracted away from a second important dimension
of the justices’ rulings: the opinions written by the court. Because of the principle of
stare decisis, lower court judges must follow the precedents set by the Supreme Court,
which are mainly embodied in the opinions written by the justices to justify their votes;
these opinions establish the legal rules for lower courts and are therefore particularly
important in terms of the long run implications of the court rulings, as well as their
written justification.
Clearly our estimates of justices’ bias (piit), ability to infer the meaning of the law
(θit), and of the value of information in the court (FLEX) reflect only the voting deci-
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sions of the justices, and do not speak about the determinants of the opinions, or their
implications. On the other hand, it is important to clarify that the majority disposi-
tion of a case does not require a majority opinion (i.e., the majority for disposition may
disagree about the rule that should cover this class of cases); indeed, it is not rare to
observe justices voting with the majority, who nevertheless issue a dissenting opinion
expounding their differential interpretation of the law underlying the case. Thus, votes
and opinions are really two different instruments for achieving the two different goals of
disposition and precedence-setting. Because these two goals can be quite independent,
we believe that modeling the justices’ voting behavior apart from their opinion-writing,
while incomplete, suffices to allow us to measure the value of information and perform
the various counterfactuals in the paper. Moreover, fully modeling the opinion-writing
process, and the assigning of justices to write them, is very complex.32 We plan to return
to this in future research.
32For more details on the distinction between case disposition and rule creation see Cameron and
Kornhauser (2008), where case disposition and rule creation are linked because of the assumption that
justices care about the extent of support her opinion attracts.
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8 Appendix
Suppose that justices care about the outcome of the court ruling and are fully strategic.
Any justice i would then consider the implications of her vote assuming she is pivotal for
the decision. In this case the relevant information for justice i in case t is not only the
private information sit but also the realization that i is pivotal for the court’s decision,
given the equilibrium strategy profile σ−i followed by the remaining justices. Thus in
this case it is optimal for i to rule against the Defendant if and only if
J(σ−i, sit) ≡ Pσ−i(pivi|P )
Pσ−i(pivi|D)
fi(sit|P )
fi(sit|D)
ρ
1− ρ −
pii
1− pii ≥ 0
But given the strict MLRP satisfied by the conditional normal distributions, this implies
that the best response to any strategy of the remaining justices is a cutoff strategy,
Lemma 1 The best response to any strategy of the remaining justices is a cutoff strategy,
i.e., in any equilibrium σi satisfies
σi(si) =
{
1 if J(σ−i, sit) ≥ 0
0 if J(σ−i, sit) < 0.
Proof. The proof follows Duggan and Martinelli (2001), and is included here for con-
venience only. Suppose that σi satisfies the hypothesis. Define the sets V ≡ {s ∈ S :
J(σ−i, s) > 0} and W ≡ {s ∈ S : J(σ−i, s) < 0}, and consider σ′i such that σ′i(s) < 1
for some s ∈ V and σ′i(s) > 0 for some s ∈ W . Define A(s) ≡ U(p|P ) Pr(P |s, piv) +
U(p|D) Pr(D|s, piv) and B(s) ≡ U(d|P ) Pr(P |s, piv) +U(d|D) Pr(D|s, piv). The net ex-
pected payoff of voting to rule against the Defendant vis a vis voting to rule in favor of
the Defendant is
∆(s) ≡
∫
V
A(s) +
∫
W
B(s)−
∫
V
[σ′i(s)A(s) + (1− σ′i(s))B(s)]−
∫
W
[σ′i(s)A(s) + (1− σ′i(s))B(s)]
=
∫
V
(1− σ′i(s))[A(s)−B(s)]ds+
∫
W
σ′i(s)[B(s)− A(s)]ds.
(13)
Now, since
A(s)−B(s) = Pr(P |s, piv)[U(p|P )− U(d|P )] + Pr(D|s, piv)[U(p|D)− U(d|D)]
= Pr(P |s, piv)(1− pii)− Pr(D|s, piv)pii,
(14)
it follows that A(s)−B(s) > 0 if and only if
Pr(P |s, piv)
Pr(D|s, piv) −
pii
1− pii > 0⇔
Pr(s|P ) Pr(piv|P )p
Pr(s|D) Pr(piv|D)(1− p) −
pii
1− pii > 0⇔ J(σ−i, s) > 0
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Now, s ∈ V implies that J(σ−i, s) > 0, which in turn implies that A(s) − B(s) > 0.
Similarly, s ∈ W implies that J(σ−i, s) < 0, which in turn implies that A(s)−B(s) < 0.
Then ∆ > 0, which concludes the proof.
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Table 1: Data. Top Panel: Case Information; Lower Panel: Justice Information
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Figure 1: The Value of Information in the Court (FLEX), by Court and Issue Area (Ex-
pressive Voting Model, Private Parties, Statutory Interpretation, Lower Courts Agree).
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Basic Rights  Economics  Criminal Procedure  Federalism 
Burger  0.06  ‐0.07  ‐0.05  0.00 
Rehnquist  0.01  ‐0.11  ‐0.09  ‐0.06 
Roberts  0.06  ‐0.14  ‐0.01  ‐0.05 
‐0.15 
‐0.10 
‐0.05 
0.00 
0.05 
0.10 
Agenda SeDng 
Burger  Rehnquist  Roberts 
Figure 3: Agenda Setting Power: change in ex ante probability that the law favors the
Plaintiff. By Chief Justice, vis a vis Chief Justice Warren. (Private Parties, Statutory
Interpretation, Lower Courts Agree).
40
Table 5: Testing the Informative Pre-Vote Deliberation Model: Incidence of “flip-flops”
among pairs of justices, in small subsamples of similar cases.
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Figure 4: Bias (expressive voting model) per justice, in Economics and Basic Rights’
issues. Voting for the Plaintiff is a liberal (conservative) vote in the horizontal (vertical)
axis.
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Figure 5: Counterfactual Prediction: Unanimity vs Simple Majority (Basic Rights)
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